How the Feres Doctrine Prevents Cadets and Midshipmen of Military-Service Academies from Achieving Justice for Sexul Assault by Shin, Katherine
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 2 Article 9 
2018 
How the Feres Doctrine Prevents Cadets and Midshipmen of 
Military-Service Academies from Achieving Justice for Sexul 
Assault 
Katherine Shin 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine Shin, How the Feres Doctrine Prevents Cadets and Midshipmen of Military-Service Academies 
from Achieving Justice for Sexul Assault, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 767 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss2/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 767 
HOW THE FERES DOCTRINE PREVENTS CADETS 
AND MIDSHIPMEN OF MILITARY-SERVICE 
ACADEMIES FROM ACHIEVING JUSTICE FOR 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Katherine Shin* 
 
Sixty-seven years ago, Feres v. United States foreclosed service members 
from pursuing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for 
“injuries incident to their service.”  The progeny of case law that has since 
developed, the basis for what is known as the Feres doctrine, expanded the 
scope of what the Feres Court originally articulated as an injury incident to 
service.  Now, cadets and midshipmen of military-service academies who 
allege that the government (i.e., the administration of military-service 
academies) was negligent in handling their sexual assaults are precluded 
from bringing an FTCA claim because their injuries are classified as 
“incident to their service” under Feres. 
Cadets and midshipmen occupy an ambiguous status as both service 
members and students of military-service academies.  Although cadets and 
midshipmen are considered service members under the law, they are also 
students of military-service academies where they will graduate with a 
bachelor’s degree and incur an active-duty obligation to serve in the officer 
corps of the U.S. Armed Forces after they graduate. 
This Note focuses on the ambiguous status of cadets and midshipmen and 
argues that they are more akin to students of civilian colleges than active-
duty service members.  Unlike cadets and midshipmen, civilian students can 
raise Title IX claims against their universities for student-on-student sexual 
harassment or assault.  By comparing how claims fare for cadets and 
midshipmen under Feres to the same claims by civilian students under Title 
IX, this Note argues that cadets and midshipmen do not have the same 
opportunity to achieve justice as civilian students in like circumstances. 
This Note additionally examines the legal and policy arguments against 
extending the Feres doctrine to cadets and midshipmen.  Considering the 
evidence that suggests when superiors allow sexual harassment it may lead 
to higher instances of sexual harassment and assault in the military ranks, 
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this Note urges Congress to reexamine the FTCA to limit the scope of the 
judicially made Feres doctrine to exclude cadets and midshipmen from 
bringing FTCA claims for the negligent mismanagement of their sexual 
assaults by academy administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The word is out!  If you are a rapist, go into the military where you will be 
protected after you rape someone. 
—Annie Kendzior, former Midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy1 
Around 1:00 a.m. on May 9, 2010,2 Jane Doe,3 a college student, agreed 
to go out for a walk with a fellow student and friend, Robert Smith.4  On the 
surface, Doe’s night seems no different than what any young person might 
encounter as part of the typical U.S. college experience. 
Jane Doe was a cadet at the United States Military Academy—commonly 
known as West Point.5  Doe had graduated at the top of her high school class 
and was nominated by one of her senators as the “top candidate in her state.”6  
Doe applied to West Point in the hopes of attending a prestigious four-year 
college that produced women of “leadership, honor, and dignity.”7  Unlike 
graduates of civilian colleges, however, West Point cadets incur a military-
 
 1. Overview of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military 
Service Academies:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the H. Comm. on 
Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 64 (2017) [hereinafter MSA Sexual Violence Hearing] (statement 
of Annie Kendzior). 
 2. The facts set forth in this Introduction are based entirely upon the plaintiff’s amended 
complaint.  In reviewing the district court’s decision in the dismissal stage, the Second Circuit 
took these allegations as true and construed them in the most favorable light to the plaintiff. 
See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 38–40, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 3. Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York granted Jane Doe’s 
motion to use a pseudonym for her court proceedings.  The defendants did not object. Doe v. 
Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d 672, 676 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 4. The use of this pseudonym was also granted. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 40 n.2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Second Amended Complaint at 2, Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (No. 13 Civ. 2802 (AKH)), ECF No. 40.  To apply for admission to West Point or any 
other military-service academy, a candidate must fulfill basic age, marital, medical, and 
physical requirements.  The applicant must also receive a congressional nomination from 
either their representatives, one of their senators, or the Vice President of the United States. 
Steps to Admissions:  The West Point Application Process, W. POINT, 
https://www.usma.edu/admissions/SitePages/Steps.aspx [https://perma.cc/JAZ3-TSFQ] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 7. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 2. 
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service obligation as commissioned officers of the U.S. Army upon 
graduation.8 
At first, Doe excelled in everything West Point had to offer.  She joined 
extracurricular activities and achieved high grades in her courses.9  One 
faculty member noted that Doe was “one of the most professional and 
internally motivated cadets I’ve worked with” and that he “would gladly 
recruit her to serve on my team, regardless of the mission.”10  However, over 
time, Doe began to feel increasingly isolated.11  Doe was one of 
approximately two hundred women that made up 15 percent of her college 
class.12  West Point’s hypermasculine culture, condoned and implicitly 
encouraged by school administrators and the policies they enacted, entailed 
constant gender-based harassment and degradation.13  For example, cadets 
participating in team-building activities would shout crude, sexually charged 
chants such as:  “I wish that all the ladies / were holes in the road / and I was 
a dump truck / I’d fill ’em with my load . . . I wish that all the ladies / were 
statues of Venus / and I was a sculptor / I’d break ’em with my penis.”14  
Faculty did not intervene to mitigate this hostile environment and sometimes 
encouraged it by sympathizing with heterosexual male cadets about the 
difficulty of getting sex at West Point.15  Some school policies echoed 
surprisingly archaic and discriminatory gender-based practices, for instance, 
requiring only female cadets to test for sexually transmitted diseases.16  West 
Point’s administrators not only implemented these policies, they also failed 
to protect female cadets who reported unwanted sexual contact from male 
supervisors.17  It comes as no surprise that, in the midst of this environment, 
Doe sought medical attention and was prescribed a mild sedative for 
anxiety.18 
On this particular day, Doe took her anxiety medication before the early 
morning walk with Robert Smith.19  Unbeknownst to her, the medication 
began to interact with alcohol Smith provided, and Doe slipped into 
unconsciousness.20  When she awoke, Doe found herself covered in dirt and 
bruises, with blood between her legs.21  The physical evidence indicated that 
Smith had raped her when she lost consciousness.22 
 
 8. Your Career After West Point, W. POINT, https://www.usma.edu/admissions/ 
SitePages/Careers.aspx [https://perma.cc/M84X-WX3T] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 9. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 4. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 6. 
 16. Id. at 8–9. 
 17. Id. at 7. 
 18. Id. at 10–11. 
 19. Id. at 11–12. 
 20. Id. at 12. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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The West Point administrators’ post-sexual-assault intervention only 
prolonged Doe’s trauma.  The school nurse failed to preserve any evidence 
of the sexual assault23 and Doe met with West Point’s designated sexual 
assault response counselor only once, who explained that Doe had the choice 
of filing either an unrestricted or a restricted report.24  Doe decided to file a 
restricted report which did not call for official action and did not name the 
perpetrator.25  Doe, like many other survivors of sexual assault at military-
service academies, feared retaliation and tarnishing her reputation at West 
Point.26  She did not want to be labeled as a “troublemaker” for breaking 
rules, being out past curfew, and for drinking alcohol with Smith.27  Even 
though Doe had filed a report, she received only one email two weeks later 
from another counselor who had apparently been referred Doe’s case from 
her original counselor.28  West Point failed to extend Doe the support she 
needed.29  Ultimately, Jane Doe chose to resign from West Point, and in 
August 2010, she was honorably discharged from the Army.30 
Sadly, Doe’s story is not uncommon, even today.  According to an annual 
report on sexual harassment and assault at military-service academies 
(MSAs), a total of eighty-six reports of sexual assault were made at the three 
MSAs from 2015 to 2016.31  Out of this total, twenty-six reports were filed 
at West Point.32  Compared to when Doe had attended West Point, the total 
number of reports made at West Point has increased by sixteen.33  In 
addition, the total reported sexual assaults at all MSAs has increased by nine 
reports since Doe’s attendance.34  Although the Department of Defense 
(DoD) has hypothesized that the increased reporting may have been the result 
of more people willing to report assaults, the fact remains that sexual assault 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Unlike unrestricted reports, restricted reports do not initiate official action and do not 
disclose the name of the perpetrator.  See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 25. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 13. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 14. 
 30. Id. 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AT THE 
MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES, ACADEMIC PROGRAM YEAR 2015–2016, at 5–6 (2016), 
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/MSA/APY_15-16/APY_15_16_MSA_Report_v2 
[https://perma.cc/7X4P-UYG7].  The five federal military-service academies are:  U.S. 
Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Air Force Academy, U.S. Coast Guard 
Academy, and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy.  This Note will specifically focus on the first 
three military-service academies because their graduates are commissioned into the traditional 
U.S. Armed Forces and, more importantly, because they are the oldest and most prestigious 
military institutions, viewed by the public as comparable to the most elite U.S. civilian 
colleges. See infra Part II. 
 32. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 31, at 8. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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is a persistent issue not only at MSAs, but in the U.S. Armed Forces 
generally.35 
Moreover, cadets and midshipmen (i.e., cadets at the U.S. Naval Academy; 
“midshipwomen” is never used) are limited in their abilities to pursue justice 
for sexual assault.36  Due to their status as service members while attending 
their respective academies, cadets and midshipmen are denied the due 
process civilian college students would receive in similar situations.37  This 
unequal treatment is puzzling when one considers that the three highly 
prestigious MSAs present themselves as equals to elite civilian colleges and 
in fact compete with them for blue-chip applicants.38  Given the social 
salience and current controversy regarding sexual harassment and assault,39 
it is worth reexamining the basis of this differential treatment and reassessing 
whether it should continue as a matter of law. 
This Note will examine the two common claims that military sexual assault 
victims pursue:  (1) Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims against the 
United States for negligent supervision of federal employees, and 
(2) Bivens40 claims against individual defendants for violations of the 
constitutionally protected right of equal protection stemming from gender 
discrimination.  This Note will focus primarily on the Feres41 doctrine 
governing the underlying reasons for prohibiting military service members—
including cadets and midshipmen at the MSAs—from pursuing these two 
categories of claims.  Part I.A describes Feres and subsequent cases that have 
come to form the Feres doctrine.  Part I.B surveys how subsequent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions have shaped the Feres doctrine and how it is 
applied in lower courts. 
Part II provides an overview of Title IX and discusses how other higher-
education institutions approach sexual harassment and assault claims under 
Title IX.  Part III evaluates how a hypothetical claim brought by a cadet under 
Title IX would play out and compares those results to how courts currently 
resolve such claims under the Feres doctrine. 
By comparing MSAs and other higher-education institutions in light of 
Title IX and the Feres doctrine, Part IV argues that Feres raises legal and 
policy concerns when applied to cadets and midshipmen with sexual assault 
 
 35. See Lolita C. Baldor, Sexual Assault Reports Up at Navy, Army Academies, PBS NEWS 
HOUR (Mar. 15, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/sexual-assault-
reports-navy-army-academies [https://perma.cc/Q85W-7CVY]; Aria Bendix, U.S. Naval and 
Military Academies See Rise in Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/us-naval-and-military-academies-
see-rise-in-sexual-assault/519912/ [https://perma.cc/98FD-5ZCN]; Helene Cooper, Reports of 
Sexual Assault Increase at Two Military Academies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2mKUqTi [https://perma.cc/YD5S-BKWW]. 
 36. See infra Part III.A. 
 37. See infra Part III.A. 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 40. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 41. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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and discrimination claims.  In particular, this Part explores how military 
superiors who allow sexual harassment contribute to an increased likelihood 
of sexual harassment or assaults and how this impacts cadets and 
midshipmen.  Accordingly, Part V proposes a model statute Congress could 
enact to carve such issues arising at MSAs out from Feres doctrine coverage. 
I.  THE MILITARY:  FERES DOCTRINE AND BIVENS CLAIMS 
To understand how courts consider MSA sexual assault claims under the 
FTCA, it is important to understand the Feres doctrine and Bivens claim 
jurisprudence.  Part I.A discusses the Federal Tort Claims Act and the 
Supreme Court decisions that substantially narrowed its application in Feres 
and its progeny.  Part I.B then describes Bivens, which recognized an implied 
cause of action for damages on the part of individuals whose constitutional 
rights were violated, as well as subsequent Bivens case law. 
A.  The Feres Doctrine:  FTCA Claims and Bivens Claims 
The Feres doctrine first developed as a judicially made doctrine to address 
tort claims brought by service members against the government.  In its 
infancy, the Feres doctrine recognized that service members may be injured 
by other federal employees, outside the scope of their activities as soldiers, 
and that their status as soldiers did not grant the government blanket 
immunity from service members’ tort claims.42  However, as Parts I.A.1 and 
I.A.2 show, the Supreme Court, with each subsequent iteration, developed 
and expanded the Feres doctrine to consider more factors in its analysis of 
whether the service member could recover damages against the government, 
which in effect, narrowed the likelihood of recovery for service members 
who brought claims under the FTCA. 
1.  Laying the Foundation:  Brooks and Feres 
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act43 to allow tort claims 
against the United States for injuries caused by federal employees44 acting in 
 
 42. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50–52 (1949). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (2012).  Federal courts have original jurisdiction for FTCA 
claims: 
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims 
against the United States, for money damages, . . .  for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act or omission occurred. 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (establishing the scope of liability 
of the United States). 
 44. Under the FTCA, federal employees include “officers or employees of any federal 
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, [and] members of the 
National Guard while engaged in training or duty . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 
774 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
their official capacity.45  Within the military context, the Supreme Court held 
in Brooks v. United States46 that members of the United States Armed Forces 
could pursue remedies under the FTCA and allowed military service 
members to recover against the government for injuries they sustained “not 
incident to their service.”47 
A year later, the Supreme Court defined what “incident to service” meant 
in Feres v. United States.48  Feres was actually three separate cases49 
consolidated into one, each raising the question of whether an active-duty 
service member who sustained an injury due to the negligence of other 
military personnel and under other circumstances suffered an actionable 
wrong, can recover under the FTCA.50  The Supreme Court gave a negative 
answer in all three cases, effectively rendering a vanishingly narrow 
interpretation of Brooks’s “not incident to service” rider, much to the dismay 
of present and future service member claimants. 
The Feres Court’s reasoning behind its “incident to service” rule can be 
broken down into three parts.  First, the Court considered whether 
recognizing the service members’ claims under the FTCA would create new 
causes of action that Congress did not intend.  Second, the Court discussed 
how service members’ and the federal government’s relationship is defined 
by federal laws and how this relationship conflicts with the FTCA’s 
construction of state tort law to govern liability.  Third, the Court discussed 
other statutory provisions that already provide remedies for service 
members’ injuries and used them as a reason to construe their ability to obtain 
FTCA remedies narrowly. 
The Feres Court recognized that the FTCA was the “culmination of a long 
effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit.”51  
These unjust consequences stemmed from the fact that, but for the 
happenstance that wrongs had been committed by a federal employee, the 
injured would have had an opportunity to seek legal recourse in court.52  Even 
though Congress enacted the FTCA to provide relief for the government 
employees’ tortious actions, Congress explicitly included a “private 
liabilities” test to make clear that the claims actionable under the FTCA were 
 
 45. Under the FTCA, military personnel acting in an official capacity means “acting in 
[the] line of duty.” Id. 
 46. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 47. See id. at 50. 
 48. 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).  To determine whether a service member’s claim is 
precluded under the Feres doctrine, courts analyze whether the service member’s injury was 
incident to service. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682 (1987).  This Note 
will refer to this line of analysis as the “incident-to-service” test. 
 49. The three claimants were (1) the executrix of service member Feres recovering for his 
death due to a fire in his barracks at Pine Camp, New York; (2) plaintiff service member 
Jefferson who brought a medical malpractice suit after he was found to have a towel marked 
“Medical Department U.S. Army” in his stomach during a surgical procedure; and (3) the 
executrix of service member Griggs who died from alleged negligent medical treatment by 
army surgeons. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 136–37. 
 50.  Id. at 138. 
 51. Id. at 139. 
 52. See id. at 139–40. 
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those that might also be brought against a private tortfeasor.53  Put another 
way, Congress did not want to expose the government to “novel and 
unprecedented liabilities.”54  Applying this principle—that Congress enacted 
the FTCA in part to limit the government’s liability to existing causes of 
action—the Court held in Feres that there were no laws on the books or 
doctrine in common law permitting military personnel to recover monetary 
damages from their superior officers or from the government, and therefore 
it could not validate the plaintiffs’ FTCA claims.55 
On the other hand, the Court did acknowledge that but for the status of the 
claimant as a service member and the government as a sovereign, private 
liability would exist for injuries arising from the negligence of federal 
employees.56  However, the Court noted that “the liability assumed by the 
Government here is that created by ‘all the circumstances,’ not that which a 
few of the circumstances might create.”57  Or, in simpler terms, the Court 
recognized that the claimant’s status as a service member and the 
government’s status as a sovereign could not be separated from the cause of 
action. 
Further, the FTCA explicitly designates “the law of the place where the act 
or omission occurred” to determine the substantive law governing a tort 
claim.58  The Court reasoned that since the military designates the location 
and the duration of a service member’s service, hinging the scope of liability 
for injuries incident to service on the location of where the injury occurred 
would not be rational due to the fact that each states’ limitation on liability 
differs drastically.59  Moreover, as the Court articulated in United States v. 
Standard Oil Co.,60 the service members’ relationship with the government 
is “distinctively federal in character” and ultimately controlled by federal, 
not state, authority.61 
Lastly, the Court discussed the federal compensation systems in place that 
already provide remedies for discharged service members, widows, or 
surviving family members.62  The Court noted that two of the plaintiffs had 
received adequate payments from the government for the injuries the service 
members sustained.63 
 
 53. See id. at 141.  “The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
 54. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. (recognizing that a civilian doctor would be subject to malpractice liability 
under similar circumstances). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 143 (quoting the FTCA). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
 61. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 305–06). 
 62. Id. at 145. 
 63. See id. 
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2.  Three Broad Rationales:  Stencel Aero and Johnson 
The Feres Court’s initial articulation of the incident-to-service rule did not 
last long.  Over time, the Supreme Court clarified its initial incident-to-
service rule with “three broad rationales.”  The Supreme Court first 
articulated the rationales in 1977 in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United 
States,64 and relied on them for rulings ten years later in United States v. 
Johnson.65  In Stencel Aero, the Supreme Court defined Feres’s three broad 
rationales as:  (1) the federal relationship between the government and 
service members; (2) an alternative compensation scheme, such as the 
Veterans’ Benefits Act (VBA) that provides for injuries sustained by service 
members; and (3) 
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme 
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed 
for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty.66 
To summarize and for ease of reference, this Note will refer to the three 
rationales as:  (1) the uniquely federal nature of military service; (2) the 
presence of alternative compensation schemes; and (3) the deleterious effect 
of superiors’ legal liability on military good order and discipline. 
Feres had articulated the first two rationales, but the scope was expanded 
in Johnson.  The Johnson Court extended the Feres doctrine to injuries not 
only caused by other military personnel, but also injuries caused by federal 
civilian employees.67  The Court explained that the military-or-not status of 
the alleged tortfeasor was irrelevant to the Feres analysis, which had been 
confined to alleged liability of other service members.68  What was 
dispositive under Feres, rather, was the claimant’s status as a member of the 
military.69 
The second rationale also mentioned in Feres—the existence of an 
alternative compensation system for service members—was expanded 
further under Stencel Aero and affirmed in Johnson.  The Johnson Court 
noted that Congress most likely did not intend for service members to recover 
under the FTCA for injuries incident to service when the VBA already 
provided for such injuries.70  Moreover, the Johnson Court rearticulated their 
finding in Stencel Aero that VBA compensation was the “upper limit of 
liability” the government was responsible for regarding injuries incident to 
service.71 
 
 64. 431 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1977). 
 65. 481 U.S. 681, 688–91 (1987). 
 66. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 671–72 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 
(1954)). 
 67.  See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686–88. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. at 689. 
 70. See id. at 689–90. 
 71. See id. at 690. 
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Out of all the rationales articulated by the Johnson Court, the third 
rationale, new to the relevant jurisprudence, has become the most persuasive 
for federal courts applying the Feres doctrine.72  Unlike other occupations, 
the Johnson Court reasoned, the military requires the “obedience, unity, 
commitment, and esprit de corps” of its members to protect and serve the 
country.73  Given this “specialized society,” the Court concluded that the 
judiciary should not interfere in the military’s mission by allowing tort claims 
by service members against their superiors that might undermine the need for 
good order and discipline in the military.74 
To summarize, in Johnson, the Supreme Court, while purporting to clarify 
Feres, effectively expanded its reach by foreclosing service members’ claims 
for injuries caused by civilian employees and simultaneously signaled to 
future claimants that the Court was unwilling to “undermine the commitment 
essential to effective service” and thereby “disrupt” military good order and 
discipline.75 
B.  Bivens Claims and the Feres Doctrine 
By the time Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics76 was decided, the Feres doctrine had effectively closed off legal 
recourse in civilian courts under the FTCA for service members who 
sustained injuries “incident to their service,” broadly defined.77  Given the 
background presumption of federal sovereign immunity that the FTCA 
waived, this meant that service members had no plausible option for seeking 
remedies in court for service-related injuries.  Bivens, however, suggested a 
new route for military personnel to raise constitutional claims for money 
damages.  But as the Court grafted Feres onto Bivens and narrowed Bivens 
itself, the promise revealed itself to be a false hope. 
1.  Bivens:  A New Path to Recovery? 
Bivens did not concern a tort claim between a service member and the 
government, but rather a constitutional claim brought by a private citizen 
against the government.78  Webster Bivens alleged that agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, acting in their official capacity, entered and searched 
 
 72. Even though the Johnson Court referred to three broad rationales, the first two 
rationales had already been found to be “no longer controlling” by the time Johnson was 
decided. See Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985)). 
 73. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 
(1986)). 
 74. See id. at 690–91 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)). 
 75. See id. at 691. 
 76. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 77. Bivens was decided before the Supreme Court articulated the three broad rationales in 
Stencel Aero and Johnson. See Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley:  Three Strikes 
and Servicemembers Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93, 96–98 (1990) (discussing the outcomes 
of Feres and Johnson). 
 78. 403 U.S. at 389. 
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his residence without a warrant, threatened to arrest his family, and 
subsequently arrested him without probable cause.79  He claimed to have 
suffered injuries as a result of the agents’ violations of his constitutional 
rights under the Fourth Amendment and sued for $15,000 in damages from 
each agent.80 
The Bivens Court recognized that, even though the Fourth Amendment did 
not explicitly provide for recovery of damages,81 an award of money 
damages was an appropriate form of remedy given that Bivens had no other 
real options for redress for this constitutional violation.82  The Court 
specifically pointed out that recognizing an implied cause of action in the 
case was fitting because there were no “special factors counselling hesitation 
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”83  Furthermore, since 
Congress had not explicitly prohibited individuals from seeking damages for 
injuries arising from a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, the Court 
found that it was within its power to find an implied cause of action.84  Bivens 
thus promised an avenue for service members to bring claims for 
constitutional violations against the government, despite the absence of 
authorization by congressional statute (i.e., the FTCA, as construed by Feres 
and its progeny). 
2.  Chappell v. Wallace:  “Caution, Red Light Ahead” 
Although, in theory, service members might bring Bivens actions for 
service-related injuries implicating constitutionally protected rights, the 
Supreme Court eventually invoked Justice William Brennan’s “special 
factors counselling hesitation” language in Bivens to foreclose that 
possibility.85  In 1983, the Court, channeling Feres, held in Chappell v. 
Wallace86 that service members could not bring an action for injuries incident 
to service, whether framed as constitutional or FTCA claims.87 
In Chappell, five enlisted members of the Navy brought an action seeking 
damages and other remedies against the officers who commanded the vessel 
on which they served.88  They sued for damages under Bivens, alleging that 
their superior officers engaged in racial discrimination in violation of their 
Fifth Amendment rights.89  The District Court for the Southern District of 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 390. 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 82. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 397. 
 85. Id. at 396. 
 86. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 87. See id. at 305. 
 88. Id. at 297. 
 89. Id.  In the original suit, respondents brought a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim 
and a claim of conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
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California dismissed their claims because, among other reasons,90 the 
decisions of the U.S. Navy were nonreviewable.91  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed and found that Bivens authorized the sailors’ claims and 
articulated factors for the lower courts to utilize when assessing Bivens 
claims.92 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that it was inappropriate to extend 
Bivens due to the “special factors counselling hesitation” within the context 
of the military.93  The Court reasoned that the “peculiar and special 
relationship of the soldier to his superiors,”94 as well as the “need for special 
regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and 
justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice”95 requires 
the judiciary to exercise caution before allowing a Bivens claim to proceed.  
The Court was elaborating, essentially, on the third rationale it would ratify 
five years later in Johnson:  the special need for good order and discipline in 
the military and the deleterious effect that superiors’ liability might have on 
it.96  The Chappell Court reasoned that the nature of the military institution 
required freedom to discipline soldiers and sailors through the internal chain 
of command without undue interference from the courts.97 
Not only did the Chappell Court emphasize the judiciary’s need to respect 
military good order and discipline, it also emphasized the Constitution’s 
explicit delegation of regulation of the armed forces to Congress.98  Due to 
the legislative and executive branches’ constitutional powers over the armed 
forces, the Chappell Court invoked the separation-of-powers principle as an 
underlying reason for concluding that courts need to exercise great caution 
when recognizing an implied cause of action for service members absent 
explicit guidance from Congress.99 
 
(1976). Id.  The Fifth Amendment constitutional claim is the only relevant claim for the 
purposes of this Note.  The Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), allowed 
Fifth Amendment due process claims to be brought under Bivens. See Wallace v. Chappell, 
661 F.2d 729, 730 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 90. The district court also reasoned that the service members had not exhausted available 
administrative remedies.  See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). 
 95. Id. at 300. 
 96. Although the Supreme Court initially identified this factor in Brown, the Court did not 
specifically identify the military relationship and discipline as a Feres rationale until Stencel 
Aero and Johnson. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 97. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300. 
 98. See id. at 301.  The Constitution grants plenary power to Congress “[t]o raise and 
support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o make Rules for Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14. 
 99. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302–04. 
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3.  United States v. Stanley:  “Do Not Enter” 
The Supreme Court subsequently refocused its lens and narrowed Bivens 
claims even further in United States v. Stanley.100  Stanley may be the apex 
of the Feres doctrine because its facts involved not just mere negligence but 
gross misconduct by the military against one of its members.  The claimant 
in Stanley was a former service member who had unknowingly volunteered 
for a program where the army secretly administered him the hallucinogenic 
drug LSD to study its effects.101  Due to the LSD, the claimant began to suffer 
from hallucinations, memory loss, and severe personality changes that 
eventually led to his discharge from the military and dissolution of his 
marriage.102  Five years after his discharge, the claimant was finally notified 
that he had been secretly administered LSD and subsequently sought, but was 
unsuccessful in acquiring, administrative relief.103 
The claimant eventually resorted to civilian courts and filed a claim under 
the FTCA against the government.  The District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida granted summary judgment for the government, finding 
that the claimant’s injuries were incident to service and therefore not 
actionable under the FTCA.104  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 
the FTCA claim, but allowed the claimant to raise a Bivens claim against the 
individual military officials and civilians of the drug program by pleading a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against deprivation of life and liberty 
without due process.105 
Although the district court granted partial summary judgment for the 
government due to the fact that the claimant could not identify the proper 
military officials to sue, the court of appeals gave the claimant an opportunity 
to amend his claim to name at least one defendant.106  During the proceedings 
on the claimant’s second amended complaint, the Chappell decision was 
released and the district court reaffirmed its previously vacated order.107  
Despite the fact that the Chappell and Bivens remedy was not available to 
service members because of the deleterious effect on military good order and 
discipline, the district court allowed the claimant’s Bivens claim to proceed 
because it found that the special factors only applied to service members who 
brought a claim against a superior officer for “direct orders in the 
performance of military duty and the discipline and order necessary 
thereto.”108  Moreover, the district court supported its decision by noting that 
there were no congressionally prescribed remedies in place for the type of 
 
 100. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 101. See id. at 671. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 672. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 673–74.  Stanley eventually named ten civilian defendants and “unknown 
individual federal and state agents and officers.” Id. at 674 n.2. 
 107. See id. at 675. 
 108. See id. (quoting Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D. Fla. 1983)). 
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egregious injuries the claimant suffered.109  The defendants sought 
interlocutory appeal which the Eleventh Circuit granted.110  The court of 
appeals affirmed and allowed the Bivens claim to proceed.111 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.112  The Stanley Court 
applied Feres’s incident-to-service bar to the claimant’s constitutional claims 
for service-related injuries.113  In the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia 
noted that “[a] test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular 
suits would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would 
itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military 
matters.”114  The Stanley Court also found the lack of an alternative remedy 
for the claimant irrelevant in determining whether the courts should intrude 
upon military affairs.115  Thus, the “special factors counselling hesitation” 
became less of a cautionary measure and more of a secondary line of analysis.  
Due to the special factors, the Court held that both Bivens and FTCA claims 
should undergo the same Feres incident-to-service analysis.116 
Although all justices unanimously agreed that Stanley was not entitled to 
recover under the FTCA due to the fact that his injuries were sustained 
incident to service,117 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Brennan 
strongly dissented118 to the Court’s decision to dismiss Stanley’s 
constitutional claims to recover damages for the government subjecting 
Stanley to secret, nonconsensual human experimentation while he was 
serving in the U.S. Army. 
Justice O’Connor emphasized that the government’s conduct went beyond 
mere negligence, or even deliberate indifference, to conduct that was “so far 
beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot 
be considered a part of the military mission.”119  She particularly admonished 
the Court for using Chappell’s “judicially crafted” rule to “insulate 
defendants from liability for deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise 
healthy military personnel to medical experimentation without their 
consent . . . for no other reason than to gather information on the effect of 
[LSD] on human beings.”120 
 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id.  While this case was pending, the Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth Circuit 
and Eleventh Circuit. See Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 111. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 675. 
 112. Id. at 676. 
 113. See id. at 681. 
 114. Id. at 682. 
 115. See id. at 683. 
 116. See id. at 683–84. 
 117. See id. at 670. 
 118. Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 708 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Brennan wrote a dissent 
which Justice Marshall joined in full and which Justice Stevens joined in part. Id. at 686 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 709 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 120. Id. 
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Further denouncing the Court’s decision regarding Stanley’s constitutional 
claim, Justice Brennan reproached the Court for “disregard[ing] the 
commands of our Constitution, and bow[ing] instead to the purported 
requirements of a different master, military discipline.”121  Justice Brennan 
further highlighted the apparent hypocrisy in the United States military’s 
actions, as it had criminally prosecuted Nazi officials for experimenting on 
human subjects only a few years earlier.122 
Stanley finally achieved some recourse in 1994 when Congress passed 
private legislation,123 which established an arbitration panel to determine 
whether Stanley was entitled to damages and, if so, to determine the award 
amount (up to $400,577).124  The arbitration panel voted two to one for 
Stanley and awarded him the maximum amount of recovery allowed.125  
Therefore, although Stanley achieved legal recourse after nearly twenty years 
of legal battles, this was only possible due to Congress’s own efforts and it 
can be assumed that remedy through private legislation is not a viable option 
for most service members who cannot recover under Bivens. 
4.  The Feres Doctrine in the Courts of Appeals:  A Fork in the Road 
Although the Supreme Court held that service members who sustained 
injuries incident to service are not entitled to recovery under the FTCA or 
Bivens, the Supreme Court did not clarify how to ascertain whether an injury 
arose incident to service.126  Recall that the Johnson Court laid down three 
broad rationales to guide a court’s Feres inquiry, but these rationales have 
proved too broad and thus difficult to apply.127  As a result, federal courts 
over time have applied a case-by-case inquiry, which has led to inconsistent 
applications of the Feres doctrine across various circuits.128  To sample 
Feres’s inconsistencies throughout the circuit courts, this section compares 
two approaches to the doctrine. 
As the Fifth Circuit retraced the evolution of the Feres doctrine in Parker 
v. United States,129 it noted the increasing murkiness of when an injury is 
incident to service.130  To clarify the fact-based inquiry of the Feres 
 
 121. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 687–88. 
 123. Private laws only apply to a specific individual or group of people. Public and Private 
Laws, GOVINFO, https://www.govinfo.gov/help/plaw [https://perma.cc/YD2H-ZTMF] (last 
updated Jan. 22, 2018). 
 124. Bob Erlandson, Ex-Sergeant Compensated for LSD Experiments Tests by Army, CIA 
Done at Edgewood, BALT. SUN (Mar. 7, 1996), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-03-
07/news/1996067079_1_stanley-lsd-fort-knox [https://perma.cc/P3QQ-UDG2]. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2007). 
 127. See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1038–43 (2d Cir. 1995) (recounting the 
inconsistences of the Feres doctrine throughout its history and noting the difficulties of 
applying the doctrine). 
 128. See id. 
 129. 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 130. See id. at 1008–11. 
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doctrine’s incident-to-service analysis, the Parker court articulated three 
factors to determine whether the service member’s FTCA claim may 
proceed:  (1) the duty status of the service member, (2) the place of injury, 
and (3) what activity the service member was engaged in at the time of the 
injury.131  This test—known as the Parker test—has become the standard 
inquiry for applying the Feres doctrine within the Fifth Circuit.132 
However, variations of the Parker test also exist depending on the factual 
circumstances of the service member’s claim.  For example, in service 
members’ medical malpractice suits, the first factor, which inquires into the 
service member’s duty status, “subsumes” the third factor, which inquires 
into the service member’s activity.133  The third factor then is replaced with 
an inquiry into whether the service member’s medical treatment “was 
intended to return him to military service.”134  Thus, although the Fifth 
Circuit generally considers duty status the most critical factor of the Parker 
test, the third factor is the most important factor in determining whether the 
service member was injured incident to service in medical malpractice 
suits.135 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit takes a broader approach to the 
Feres doctrine by only relying upon the three broad rationales articulated in 
Johnson.136  The Sixth Circuit noted in Major v. United States137 that Feres 
had expanded 
to encompass, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that 
are even remotely related to the individual’s status as a member of the 
military, without regard to the location of the event, the status (military or 
civilian) of the tortfeasor, or any nexus between the injury-producing event 
and the essential defense/combat purpose of the military activity from 
which it arose.138 
Even in subsequent cases, the Sixth Circuit has not articulated a multiple-
factor test, as the Fifth Circuit has, and instead bases its decisions on other 
circuit cases with similar factual inquiries to the case under consideration.139 
In sum, depending on where the service member raises his or her claim, 
the results might differ due to the differences in each circuit’s Feres analysis.  
While some circuits may consider the duty status of the service member as 
the most pertinent factor in its analysis, other circuits choose to analyze the 
claim in a broader context.  With circuit courts differing in application of the 
 
 131. Id. at 1013. 
 132. See Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 133. Snell v. Simpson, No. 09-992-BAJ-SCR, 2011 WL 13202679, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 
2, 2011) (quoting Schoemer v. United States, 59 F.3d 26, 28–29 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 134. See id. at *4 (quoting Schoemer, 59 F.3d at 28–29). 
 135. See id. at *5. 
 136. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 137. 835 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 138. Id. at 644–45. 
 139. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 570 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2009); Mackey v. 
United States, 226 F.3d 773, 776 (6th Cir. 2000); Skees v. United States, 107 F.3d 421, 423–
24 (6th Cir. 1997); Wright v. United States, No. 91-2404, 1992 WL 279314, at *3–4 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 9, 1992) (per curiam). 
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Feres doctrine, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact scope of the doctrine and 
to which specific circumstances the doctrine extends. 
5.  Klay and Cioca:  Dead End 
Although various circuit courts have been inconsistent with regards to their 
application of the Feres doctrine, they have achieved some consensus 
regarding the unavailability of Bivens claims for service members. 
During 2013 and 2014, the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit heard similar 
Bivens actions brought by former and current service members of various 
branches of the U.S. Armed Forces who had been sexually assaulted by their 
peers.  Both cases, Cioca v. Rumsfeld140 and Klay v. Panetta,141 alleged that 
the former Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries of the Navy, and the 
Commandants of the Marines142 violated the service members’ constitutional 
rights, namely their First Amendment rights of free speech, Fifth Amendment 
rights of equal protection and due process, and Seventh Amendment rights 
to a jury trial.143  Both cases had similar allegations:  the plaintiffs suffered 
undue harm from the mismanagement of their sexual assaults by the military 
and government.144 
Although both courts noted the plaintiffs’ suffering, both also recognized 
that no Bivens remedies were available for service members whose injuries 
were incident to service.145  Both courts concluded that the incident-to-
service test was colored by the fact that it was inappropriate for courts to 
“pass judgment on the merits of the Defendants’ military decisions, which 
Supreme Court precedent has concluded is not within . . . judicial branch 
function.”146  In other words, the courts did not wish to recognize an implied 
cause of action and overstep separation-of-powers principles absent explicit 
congressional authorization.147  The Fourth Circuit panel opined that “Bivens 
suits are never permitted for constitutional violations arising from military 
service, no matter how severe the injury or how egregious the rights 
infringement.”148 
Bivens actions are no longer an available route for service members to seek 
legal recourse for sexual assault during their military careers.  However, 
unlike Bivens actions, which rest upon an implied cause of action, the FTCA 
explicitly allows service members to recover for injuries sustained not 
 
 140. 720 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 141. 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 142. Only Klay alleged claims against the former secretaries of the navy and commandants 
of the Marine Corps. See id. at 371. 
 143. Both Cioca and Klay alleged violation of Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection 
and due process, but only Klay alleged violation of the right to bodily integrity. Compare 
Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507, with Klay, 758 F.3d at 372. 
 144. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 371–72. 
 145. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 377. 
 146. Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 375. 
 147. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 375–76. 
 148. Cioca, 720 F.3d at 512 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–
22 (5th ed. 2007)). 
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incident to their service.  Thus, in theory, despite Feres, a service member 
might yet prevail on a sexual assault FTCA claim so long as he or she can 
establish that the injuries were not incident to service. 
II.  MILITARY-SERVICE ACADEMIES:  WHAT DO WE DO WITH THEM? 
Under § 3075(b)(2),149 cadets and professors of West Point are part of the 
United States Army.150  Similar statutes cover professors, cadets, and 
midshipmen enrolled at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) in Annapolis, 
Maryland, and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado.  Since cadets and midshipmen are members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces, courts do not distinguish between the military in general and MSAs 
in their analysis of FTCA claims brought by cadets or midshipmen of MSAs, 
including in their application of the Feres doctrine. 
Before proceeding with how MSAs are analyzed under Feres, it is 
important to lay out the basic characteristics of MSAs.  MSAs are 
quintessentially different than the active-duty branches of the military and in 
certain ways are more akin to civilian colleges than the military at large.  For 
example, all three MSAs are accredited universities151 that grant cadets and 
midshipmen bachelor’s degrees upon graduation.152  All three MSAs offer 
similar academic programs, with more than twenty majors ranging from 
science and engineering to humanities.153  Similar to other institutions of 
higher learning, the MSAs also offer various extracurricular activities such 
as clubs and athletic teams for cadets and midshipmen to participate in during 
their four years at the academies.154  And, as a practical matter, the three 
 
 149. 10 U.S.C. § 3075(b)(2) (2012). 
 150. 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 28 (2018). 
 151. West Point and the Naval Academy are accredited by the Middle States Commission 
on Higher Education while the Air Force Academy is accredited by the Higher Learning 
Commission. See Accreditation, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Academics/ 
Academic-Dean/Accreditation.php [https://perma.cc/TE3V-YFRM] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018); Graduating from the Academy: Curriculum, U.S.A.F. ACAD., 
https://www.usafa.edu/academics/registrar/curriculum/ [https://perma.cc/Z6V4-MZPL] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018); Welcome to the Office of the Dean, U.S. MIL. ACAD., 
https://www.usma.edu/academics/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/5HH4-WXXG] 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 152. See About USNA, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/About/index.php 
[https://perma.cc/W2X5-7FEF] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); About West Point, U.S. MIL. ACAD., 
https://www.westpoint.edu/About/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/J5KB-RR8F] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018); Graduating from the Academy:  Curriculum, supra note 151. 
 153. See Academics, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Academics/Majors-and-
Courses/index.php [https://perma.cc/X6JK-TG2G] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Academics at a 
Different Altitude, U.S.A.F. ACAD., https://www.usafa.edu/academics/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6U4D-UAVU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Curriculum, U.S. MIL. ACAD., 
https://www.westpoint.edu/curriculum/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Y8G-UFG5] 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 154. See Midshipman Interests, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/MidActivities/ 
[https://perma.cc/8JUT-V6E8] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Welcome to the Directorate of Cadet 
Activities, U.S. MIL. ACAD., https://www.westpoint.edu/dca/SitePages/Home.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/72G9-F2UC] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); What Life Is Like at the Academy’s 
Altitude, U.S.A.F. ACAD., https://www.usafa.edu/cadet-life/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SY2F-TU6D] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
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traditional MSAs compete for blue-chip students with elite civilian colleges, 
and they in fact advertise themselves as a reasonable, free option for a high-
quality college education comparable to the civilian institutions.155 
However, MSAs differ from civilian institutions of higher learning in 
certain respects.156  Unlike students at civilian universities, cadets and 
midshipmen are required by law to serve for at least five years as active-duty 
commissioned officers of the military upon graduation.157  However, the 
service obligation does not vest until after the second year of studies at an 
MSA is completed.158  To prepare the cadets and midshipmen for their roles 
as officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, all MSAs incorporate military and 
physical training into their curricula alongside their academic programs.159  
Hence, unlike civilian university students, cadets and midshipmen follow a 
strict daily schedule that requires all cadets and midshipmen to wake up, eat, 
learn, and train during the same regimented hours.160  In addition to the strict 
military and physical training regimens during the academic year, cadets and 
midshipmen are required to participate in military training for a few weeks 
during the summer between each academic year.161  Thus, MSAs not only 
purport to offer top-quality university education for their cadets and 
midshipmen, but their required military training and education component 
differentiates them from other civilian institutions and resembles the active-
duty branches of the military.  In effect, the cadets and midshipmen of MSAs 
occupy a gray area:  they are simultaneously fledgling active-duty officers of 
 
 155. USMA Admissions—the Corps Starts Here!, U.S. MIL. ACAD., 
https://www.westpoint.edu/admissions/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/THN2-
R5FX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 156. This denotes other state-run military higher-education institutions such as senior 
military colleges (e.g., Virginia Military Institute) that are civilian colleges that require all its 
students to enroll in a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. See Military Colleges 
and Academies, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/military-colleges [https://perma.cc/S3B7-
THQB] (last updated Mar. 13, 2018); Service Academies & Senior Military Colleges, 
TODAY’S MIL., https://todaysmilitary.com/training/service-academies-and-military-colleges 
[https://perma.cc/AFB6-8HY3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 157. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 4348(a)(2)(A)–(B), 6959(a)(2)(A)–(B), 9348(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 158. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d. 36, 51 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 159. See Academics, supra note 153; Applying to College Is a Big Step, U.S. MIL. ACAD., 
https://www.westpoint.edu/admissions/SitePages/Pros_Cadets.aspx [https://perma.cc/NJD3-
AYFX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Military Education, U.S.A.F. ACAD., 
https://www.usafa.edu/cadet-life/military/military-education/ [https://perma.cc/54LY-
BEDU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 160. See A Day in the Life, U.S.A.F. ACAD., https://www.usafa.edu/cadet-life/day-in-the-
life/ [https://perma.cc/7H5D-N5KS] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Cadet Life, ARMY W. POINT, 
http://goarmywestpoint.com/sports/2015/7/14/gameday_0714153634.aspx?prl=6357247063
63055257 [https://perma.cc/NEB5-8J2S] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Daily Schedule, U.S. 
NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Admissions/Student-Life/Daily-Schedule.php 
[https://perma.cc/AJF9-Z5HG] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 161. See Cadet Schedule, U.S.A.F. ACAD., http://usafa.smartcatalogiq.com/en/2015-
2016/Catalog/Cadet-Life/Cadet-Schedule [https://perma.cc/M2FU-GY6F] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018); Cadet Summer Training (CST), U.S. MIL. ACAD., https://www.westpoint.edu/ 
dmi/SitePages/Cadet%20Summer%20Training%20(CST).aspx [https://perma.cc/M89G-
S8MJ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Summer at USNA, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., 
https://www.usna.edu/Admissions/Academics/Summer-At-USNA.php [https://perma.cc/ 
HQS7-4V8V] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
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the U.S. Armed Forces and also students at accredited universities pursuing 
college degrees. 
Because these institutions operate both as educational and military 
establishments, it is important to understand how both types of 
establishments are regulated.  First, Part II.A discusses how educational 
institutions are evaluated under Title IX for issues relating to gender 
discrimination and sexual assault.  Part II.B then discusses how a 
hypothetical claim would be resolved if MSAs were subject to Title IX. 
A.  Educational Institutions and Title IX 
For educational institutions receiving federal funding, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972162 (“Title IX”) prohibits gender 
discrimination in the institutions’ programs and activities.163  Title IX 
provides exceptions ranging from educational institutions of religious 
organizations to social fraternities and sororities in institutions of higher 
learning.164  In § 1681(a)(4), Title IX specifically excludes all institutions 
whose primary purpose is to train individuals for U.S. military service.165  
Hence, even though MSAs are federally funded institutions of higher 
learning, these institutions can discriminate based upon gender under Title 
IX, and cadets and midshipmen cannot pursue claims under Title IX for 
injuries sustained from gender discrimination at the MSAs. 
B.  Title IX Basics 
To understand how civilian students’ remedies for sexual assault under 
Title IX differ from the remedies cadets and midshipmen of MSAs can 
pursue under the FTCA, it is first important to understand how Title IX 
operates and what factors are considered in order to hold schools liable for 
gender discrimination under this statute.  Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 examine 
how, under Title IX, schools may be held liable for damages for school-
employee-on-student harassment, while Parts II.B.3 and II.B.4 discuss how 
Title IX may be applied to hold schools, including higher-education 
institutions, liable for student-on-student harassment that occurred on school 
grounds. 
 
 162. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).  Section 1681(a) states:  “No person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”  Section 1681(c) defines educational institutions as 
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution 
of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an 
educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department 
which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school, 
college, or department. 
 163. Id. § 1681; see also 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights § 165 (2018). 
 164. For more exceptions contained in Title IX, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9). 
 165. Id. § 1681(a)(4). 
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1.  Cannon v. University of Chicago:  Implied Causes of Action 
Although MSAs are not covered under Title IX, it is important to 
understand how other similar educational institutions are analyzed under 
Title IX for claims brought by students for sexual assault. 
Soon after Title IX was enacted, the Supreme Court in Cannon v. 
University of Chicago166 faced the issue of whether individuals had a private 
cause of action against universities under Title IX, even though the statute 
did not explicitly provide for one.167  To determine whether Congress 
intended an implied cause of action under Title IX, the Court focused on a 
similarly worded statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168  By 
finding that Title VI provided an implied cause of action for individuals who 
had been discriminated against based upon race, color, or national origin, the 
Court found that Congress likely intended the same under Title IX for gender 
discrimination.169  Moreover, since the statutes utilized identical language 
focusing on the benefitted class rather than language prohibiting racial or 
gender discrimination in federally assisted programs, the Court inferred that 
Congress also intended to provide a cause of action for the benefitted class 
under Title IX.170 
It is important to note two factors the Court considered in addition to the 
language indicating an implied cause of action.  First, the Court inferred that 
Congress did not intend to endorse the use of public funds to financially 
support educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.171  
Second, the Court noted that recognizing a private cause of action under Title 
IX would not overburden universities.172  Specifically, the Court pointed out 
that Title VI had not produced litigation “so costly or voluminous that either 
the academic community or the courts have been unduly burdened.”173  
Furthermore, the Court found that recognizing Title IX actions would not 
result in university administrators being “so concerned about the risk of 
litigation” so as to “fail to discharge their important responsibilities in . . . [a] 
professional manner.”174  In sum, the Court found not only that the implied 
cause of action under Title IX provided a necessary remedy for individuals 
who were injured by gender discrimination, but also noted that university 
administrations were fully capable of handling any Title IX litigation. 
 
 166. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 167. Id. at 683. 
 168. See id. at 694–98.  Title VI states:  “No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 169. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690. 
 170. See id. at 690–93. 
 171. See id. at 692–93, 704. 
 172. See id. at 709–10. 
 173. Id. at 709. 
 174. Id. at 710. 
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2.  Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: 
Awarding Damages Under Title IX 
Following Cannon’s recognition of an implied cause of action under Title 
IX, the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools175 held 
that damages were an available remedy under Title IX.176  The Court 
reasoned that since Congress had not expressly stated that monetary damages 
were unavailable under Title IX, the Court retained the power to allow for 
any appropriate relief.177 
The claimant in Franklin was a student who was repeatedly sexually 
harassed and assaulted by the school’s sports coach.178  When the student 
notified the school’s administrators and asked them to address the situation, 
the school did not pursue any actions against the coach and attempted to 
discourage the student from pressing charges against him.179  Along with its 
holding that damages were available under Title IX, the Court also confirmed 
that the school district had a duty under Title IX to ensure that its staff did 
not discriminate based on sex.180  Namely, the school district had a duty to 
ensure that its staff were not engaging in sexual harassment—a type of 
gender discrimination.181 
Similar to the separation-of-powers concerns discussed in Feres and 
Bivens, the Court was once again faced with the question whether allowing 
damages as a remedy for Title IX would result in an undue expansion of 
judicial power.182  The Court answered this inquiry in the negative, focusing 
on the difference between finding a cause of action and its power to 
determine appropriate remedies.183  In particular, the Court argued that 
refusing to allow for damages would render any causes of action authorized 
(explicitly or implicitly) by Congress useless and result in greater harm to 
separation-of-power principles than “selective abdication” of the Court’s 
judicial authority.184  In particular, the Court emphasized, “From the earliest 
years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to 
award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal 
court . . . .”185 
 
 175. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 176. Id. at 76. 
 177. See id. at 70–71. 
 178. See id. at 63. 
 179. See id. at 64. 
 180. See id. at 75. 
 181. See id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). 
 182. See id. at 73. 
 183. See id. at 73–74. 
 184. See id. at 74. 
 185. Id. at 66. 
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3.  Gebser and Davis:  Deliberate Indifference and School Duties 
Regarding Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment 
Since the Supreme Court allowed individuals to recover damages against 
school administrations under Title IX, the Court had to further define to what 
extent the administration could be held liable.  In Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District,186 the Court set the standard of care required 
for school administrators under Title IX by holding that schools can be held 
liable if the school, with knowledge of the acts of sexual harassment by its 
staff, had acted with “deliberate[] indifferen[ce].”187 
The Supreme Court further clarified Gebser’s “deliberate indifference” 
language in the context of student-on-student sexual harassment in Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Education.188  The Davis Court laid out a 
framework to be satisfied in order to find schools liable for student-on-
student harassment.189  Within this framework, the Court held that a federally 
funded school is liable only when (1) the alleged harassment was “so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s 
access to an educational opportunity or benefit,” and (2) with knowledge of 
this harassment, the school acted with deliberate indifference.190 
The Davis Court further explained that the “deliberate indifference” must 
have at least caused or exposed the student to the alleged sexual 
harassment.191  Moreover, in the context of student-on-student harassment, 
schools satisfy the “deliberate indifference” requirement when their response 
“or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances.”192  The Davis Court also limited a school’s scope of liability 
to situations where the school had considerable control, not only over the 
student-harasser, but also the context in which the harassment occurred.193  
Thus, the Davis Court ensured that schools that acted reasonably in response 
to the alleged harassment would not be held liable for student-on-student 
harassment, at least to the extent over which the school had control. 
4.  Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia:  
Applying Title IX to Sexual Harassment at Universities 
The Supreme Court articulated the “deliberate indifference” standard of 
liability for teacher-on-student harassment in Gebser and adopted the same 
standard in Davis for student-on-student harassment.  Later, in 2007, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied this Title IX analysis in Williams v. Board of 
 
 186. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 187. See id. at 277. 
 188. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 189. See id. at 633. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. at 644–45. 
 192. See id. at 648. 
 193. See id. at 645. 
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Regents of the University System of Georgia194 to alleged sexual assault in 
the university context. 
The plaintiff, Tiffany Williams, was a student at the University of Georgia 
(“UGA”) who was sexually assaulted by three student-athletes.195  Although 
the plaintiff agreed to consensual sex with the first perpetrator, Tony Cole, 
she was not aware that Cole allowed his friend, Brandon Williams, to wait in 
the closet to rape the plaintiff after Cole.196  While Brandon Williams was 
assaulting the plaintiff, Cole called another friend, Steven Thomas, telling 
him they were “running a train” on the plaintiff.197  Cole invited Thomas to 
his room and Thomas proceeded to rape the plaintiff after Brandon 
Williams.198  The three perpetrators were charged criminally and under the 
university’s judiciary panel.  Yet, all three were either acquitted or not 
disciplined.199 
The plaintiff eventually brought Title IX claims against UGA, the Board 
of Regents of UGA, and the University of Georgia Athletic Association 
(UGAA).200  The district court ultimately dismissed all claims and the 
plaintiff appealed.201 
In evaluating whether UGA and UGAA were in violation of Title IX and 
liable for student-on-student harassment, the Eleventh Circuit outlined four 
elements discussed in Gebser and Davis.  The court concluded that the 
plaintiff must establish that:  (1) the institutional defendants are federal-
funding recipients; (2) the defendants had actual knowledge of the alleged 
harassment; (3) the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” that 
“subjected” the plaintiff to discrimination; and (4) the discrimination was “so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the 
victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”202 
The facts of the case eventually showed that the plaintiff’s Title IX claims 
should not have been dismissed.  After the first element was established, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that UGA and UGAA had actual knowledge of the 
harassment.203  Not only had UGA and UGAA recruited Cole into their 
athletic department knowing that he had sexually assaulted other women at 
the University of Rhode Island and had been charged with sexual misconduct 
 
 194. 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 195. See id. at 1288. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. at 1289. 
 200. The plaintiff brought four claims against the individual rapists, UGA and its board of 
regents, and the UGAA.  For the purposes of this Note, only the Title IX claim against UGA 
and UGAA are relevant and will be discussed. Id. at 1290. 
 201. See id. at 1290–91.  The Eleventh Circuit found that the Title IX claim against the 
board of regents was properly dismissed. Id. at 1293–94. 
 202. See id. at 1293 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)). 
 203. See id. at 1294.  As discussed previously, sexual harassment is considered a form of 
gender discrimination. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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at Wabash Valley College,204 but they were also aware of the rape of the 
plaintiff by the three defendants.205 
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had satisfied both 
the third and fourth elements.  Although the UGA police had provided a 
preliminary report within forty-eight hours of the incident and a full report 
within three months of the incident, UGA acted with “deliberate 
indifference” when it waited eight months to bring any disciplinary hearings 
against the defendants.206  Furthermore, UGA and UGAA, with full 
knowledge of Cole’s record, did not adequately ensure that the student-
athletes were informed of the sexual harassment policy, and their failure to 
“supervise its student-athletes subjected Williams to this further harassment 
and caused Williams to be the victim of a conspiracy between Cole, Brandon 
Williams, and Thomas to sexually assault and rape her.”207 
Due to UGA and UGAA’s “deliberate indifference,” the court reasoned, 
the university’s discriminatory actions effectively barred her from continuing 
her education at UGA.208  Although the plaintiff withdrew from UGA after 
the incident, UGA failed to take any actions against the three defendants that 
would have prevented them from attacking the plaintiff if she had chosen to 
return to continue her education at UGA.209 
While the Davis Court recognized that discrimination must “be more 
widespread than a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment,” the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had satisfied this element.210  Given 
the allegations that the defendants conspired a serial group rape of the 
plaintiff spanning two hours, the Court found that the severity of this series 
of events was objectively offensive. 
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit found that UGA and UGAA were liable 
because they had knowledge of the fact that Cole was a known predator and, 
with this knowledge, failed to supervise him.  For the other two student-
athletes, the administrators also failed to provide adequate education of the 
athletic program’s sexual harassment policy.  In light of these factors, the 
Eleventh Circuit held UGA and UGAA liable for the student-athletes’ rape 
of the plaintiff and awarded her Title IX damages. 
III.  HOW MSA CONDUCT WOULD FARE UNDER A DIFFERENT STANDARD 
Title IX effectively provides relief for individuals seeking to bring actions 
against educational institutions receiving federal funding.  It is clear that 
MSAs are exempt under Title IX.  But should they be allowed this leeway?  
As discussed previously, when a cadet or midshipman brings a tort or 
 
 204. See id. at 1290. 
 205. See id. at 1294. 
 206. See id. at 1296–97. 
 207. Id. at 1296. 
 208. See id. at 1298. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. at 1297–98 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652–
53 (1999)). 
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constitutional claim against the United States, the Feres doctrine will apply 
and courts will determine whether the injury that arose was “incident to 
service.”  However, Title IX seems to provide a fairer and more just result 
for students who choose to pursue claims against school administrations 
regarding student-on-student sexual assault.  Amending Title IX to allow 
cadets or midshipmen to recover would pave the way for achieving justice 
for individuals facing these issues at MSAs. 
By considering the facts of Doe v. Hagenbeck,211 summarized in the 
Introduction to this Note, this Part first delves into the Southern District of 
New York’s Feres analysis of Jane Doe’s claim and the outcome of Doe’s 
claim on appeal in the Second Circuit.  This Part then analyzes the facts of 
Doe under Title IX to see how Doe’s claim may have fared if she were a 
student in a federally funded civilian higher-education institution, instead of 
West Point. 
A.  The Application of Feres to Military-Service Academies 
In April 2013, Jane Doe filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York against the United States, Lieutenant General 
Franklin Lee Hagenbeck (then the superintendent of West Point and chair of 
West Point’s Sexual Assault Review Board), and Brigadier General William 
E. Rapp (then the commandant of cadets and in charge of cadet training and 
administration at West Point).  Doe brought four causes of action:  (1) a 
Bivens claim against individual defendants for due process violations under 
the Fifth Amendment; (2) a Bivens claim against individual defendants for 
equal protection violations under the Fifth Amendment; (3) a claim against 
the United States for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
under the “Little Tucker Act”;212 and (4) an FTCA claim against the United 
States for negligence, negligent supervision and training, negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, and abuse of process.213  Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein 
dismissed all but the second equal protection Bivens claim,214 permitting it 
to proceed on the ground that Doe’s complaint did not “take issue with the 
‘military disciplining structure’”215 and therefore did not implicate the two 
main judicial concerns for prohibiting Bivens claims:  “the need to preserve 
the military disciplinary structure and prevent judicial involvement in 
sensitive military matters.”216  Or, as Judge Hellerstein put it, “All she asks 
 
 211. 98 F. Supp. 3d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d in part, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 212. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012). 
 213. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 214. That Judge Hellerstein’s dismissal of Jane Doe’s FTCA claim was based on an 
exception provided for in § 2680(a) goes beyond the scope of this Note.  Other circuit courts 
who have decided FTCA claims brought by cadets and midshipmen have used the Feres 
doctrine to dismiss FTCA claims. See generally, e.g., Ruggiero v. United States, 162 F. App’x 
140 (3d Cir. 2006); Cummings v. Dep’t of Navy, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Wake v. 
United States, 89 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996); Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 
1981); Morse v. West, 975 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 215. Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (quoting Wake, 89 F.3d at 57). 
 216. Id. (quoting Wake, 89. F.3d at 57). 
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for is the dignity of equality—that there be no special rules, or practices, at 
West Point that favor male cadets over female cadets, or vice-versa, or that 
tend to degrade one sex as a means to raise or motivate another.”217  Thus, 
Judge Hellerstein found that Jane Doe’s Bivens claim was not barred under 
the Feres doctrine.218  The defendants filed for an interlocutory appeal, and 
the Second Circuit granted defendants’ motion.219 
Nevertheless, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit ultimately reversed 
Judge Hellerstein’s order by two to one, holding that Doe was a cadet at West 
Point and therefore a service member of the Army, which implicates the 
Feres doctrine and “special factors counseling hesitation.”220  Judge Debra 
Ann Livingston concluded that “[a]djudicating the claim she brings against 
her superior officers . . . would require a civilian court to examine a host of 
military decisions regarding aspects of West Point’s culture, . . . the 
supervision of West Point cadets, their training and education, and their 
discipline by superior officers.”221  In the view of the majority, West Point’s 
primary mission, to train future officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, signified 
that the college component of the MSA was inseverable from the military-
training component of the institution.222  Therefore, Doe’s claim against the 
West Point administrators for discrimination she, and other women, faced on 
campus implicated military good order and discipline.223  As in Cioca and 
Klay, the Second Circuit barred Bivens claims by cadets who sought to 
recover damages against MSA administrators and the government for sexual 
assault.224 
On the other hand, Judge Denny Chin dissented and argued that Doe’s rape 
was not an injury incident to service, rather, her “injuries were incident only 
to her status as a student.”225  Judge Chin highlighted the fact that Doe’s 
Bivens claim is not that of a service member, which might implicate military 
good order and discipline, but that of a student who “seeks recourse for 
injuries caused by purported failures on the part of school administrators 
acting in academic capacity overseeing a learning environment for 
students.”226  Furthermore, Judge Chin contended that although other cases 
such as Klay and Cioca had effectively closed off remedies for service 
members for sexual assault, Doe’s case was markedly different since her 
claim did not intrude upon the policies of high-ranking military officials.227  
Rather, the heart of Doe’s claim was whether she was “depriv[ed] of 
meaningful access to an education because of discriminatory academic 
policies or school administrators tasked with running an educational 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 689. 
 219. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 220. See id. at 49. 
 221. Id. (citations omitted). 
 222. See id. at 48–49. 
 223. See id. at 49. 
 224. See id. 
 225. Id. at 51 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 61. 
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institution.”228  In other words, Judge Chin’s dissent focused on the fact that 
Doe’s injuries were sustained “incident to being a student,” while the 
majority’s analysis was more akin to Klay and Cioca as Doe’s injuries were 
found to be incident to service.229 
B.  If Military-Service Academies Were Under Title IX 
As discussed in Part II and in Judge Chin’s Hagenbeck dissent,230 cadets 
and midshipmen occupy a gray area in the law due to the fact that they are 
considered both university students and service members.  This section 
examines how a court may analyze a potential claim against MSAs, if the 
cadets and midshipmen were alternatively categorized as students under Title 
IX.  For this line of analysis, Hagenbeck’s facts will be used to determine 
whether she would have had an actionable claim under Title IX. 
As stated previously, to determine whether a federally funded educational 
institution is liable for student-on-student harassment under Title IX, the 
Supreme Court mainly focuses on two factors in its test.231  Williams 
extended this analysis to higher-education institutions for sexual assault 
claims under Title IX.232 
After establishing that the institution is federally funded, the first factor of 
the Supreme Court’s Title IX analysis requires that the harassment was 
severe enough to bar a student from an educational benefit.233  In Jane Doe’s 
case, articulated above,234 Smith’s sexual assault and the subsequent actions, 
or inaction, by the West Point administration may qualify as discrimination 
severe enough to have barred Doe from continuing her education at West 
Point.235  Even if the sexual assault was considered a one-time incident, a 
court may also find that persistent sexual harassment and gender 
discrimination from the sexually explicit taunts, degrading comments about 
sex by superiors, and humiliating and discriminatory treatment by both 
superiors and fellow cadets, are “severe” and persistent enough to bar Doe 
from an educational benefit. 
Assuming that there is a fair likelihood that the first factor could be 
satisfied, Jane Doe would also likely satisfy the second factor of the Supreme 
Court’s Title IX analysis:  deliberate indifference.236  West Point had full 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Compare id. at 62, with id. at 49 (majority opinion). 
 230. See supra Part II.B. 
 231. The first factor refers to the harassment itself:  the discrimination, which includes the 
harassment and the subsequent events that occurred in relation to the incident, must be “so 
severe” as to bar the student from an educational benefit; it cannot be trivial.  The second 
factor focused on the actions of the school:  whether the school had knowledge of the 
harassment and whether, with the knowledge of such actions, it acted “clearly unreasonabl[y]” 
or with “deliberate indifference” in response to the situation at hand. See Williams v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 447 F.3d 1282, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 232. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 233. See supra Part II.C. 
 234. See supra Part III.A. 
 235. See supra Part II.D. 
 236. See supra Part II.C. 
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knowledge of Doe’s rape since Doe received treatment at West Point’s 
medical facility and also filed a restricted report with the school.  Although 
it may be disputed whether West Point acted “clearly unreasonabl[y]” in 
response to the rape, the nurse’s failure to collect evidence and West Point’s 
sexual assault counselor’s lack of communication might present judges with 
substantial facts to find in her favor. 
Even if Doe’s post-sexual-assault treatment fails to satisfy the “deliberate 
indifference” requirement, West Point’s consecutive failure to address the 
rampant sexual harassment and discrimination in its policies and practices 
may satisfy the requirement.  West Point administrators were not only aware 
of the multiple complaints female cadets had made about inappropriate 
treatment by their peers, but some of its own faculty participated in such 
harassment.  To this extent, Doe would possibly be able to hold West Point 
administrators liable not only for student-on-student harassment,237 but also 
under traditional Title IX provisions of school employee-on-student 
harassment.238  Since the standards for evaluating direct harassment by 
school employees are less stringent than student-on-student liability, Doe 
may have an opportunity to succeed through this route. 
However, more important than whether or not Jane Doe would succeed in 
holding West Point liable under Title IX, she would certainly have had 
sufficient evidence to proceed past the dismissal stage under Title IX.  By 
comparing Jane Doe’s potential Title IX claim and the actual results of her 
claims under the Feres doctrine, it is clear that cadets and midshipmen at 
MSAs are not given the same opportunity for legal recourse as similarly 
situated students at civilian universities. 
As this hypothetical MSA-Title IX analysis demonstrates, other options 
exist to more effectively address the needs of cadets and midshipmen.  Part 
IV discusses legal arguments and policy considerations that the Feres 
doctrine presents in real-life situations. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FERES DOCTRINE 
The Feres doctrine has not been without controversy over the nearly 
seventy years since the Supreme Court created it.  Most notable, perhaps, is 
Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Johnson, where he claimed, “Feres was 
wrongly decided and heartily deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal 
criticism’ it has received.”239  Justice Scalia is not alone in his criticism.  The 
Third Circuit once commented, “It is because Feres too often produces such 
curious results that members of this court repeatedly have expressed 
misgivings about it.”240  The Ninth Circuit raised similar concerns:  “We 
reach this conclusion only reluctantly, bound by circuit precedent to apply 
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this doctrine to yet another case that seems far removed from its original 
purposes.”241  One judge has even argued that the Feres doctrine is a 
violation of service members’ equal protection rights and constitutional 
separation-of-powers principles.242  These are but a few of the numerous 
criticisms the Feres doctrine has amassed over the years.243 
Part IV.A discusses legal arguments posited by judges contesting the 
applicability of the Feres doctrine.  Part IV.B reviews the policy arguments 
that call for reconsideration of the Feres doctrine and analyzes the real-life 
impact the doctrine has in today’s society. 
A.  Legal Arguments Against the Feres Doctrine 
Johnson solidified the three broad rationales in the Feres doctrine and 
further expanded the scope of Feres.244  However, the Johnson decision was 
split five to four, with Justice Scalia composing the dissent for Justices 
Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens.  In his dissent, Justice 
Scalia attacked the three broad rationales of Feres, claiming that the 
judicially made doctrine had “outlived [its] textual support, and the Feres 
rule is now sustained only by three disembodied estimations of what 
Congress must (despite what it enacted) have intended.”245 
Justice Scalia first addressed the three factors which formed the basis of 
Feres.  The first reason for the Supreme Court’s holding in Feres was that 
parallel private liability for service members to bring suit against the 
government did not exist as required in the text of the FTCA.246  However, 
if Congress intended this factor to preclude a service member from bringing 
FTCA claims, then several of the exceptions under the FTCA, such as those 
articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), § 2680(c), § 2680(f), and § 2680(i), were 
“superfluous” since the exceptions do not also have parallel private 
liability.247  In particular, Justice Scalia noted that “private individuals 
typically do not, for example, transmit postal matter, collect taxes or custom 
duties, impose quarantines, or regulate the monetary system.”248  Since these 
specific exceptions did not also have parallel private liability, Justice Scalia 
reasoned that such applications of the Feres doctrine were not intended by 
Congress. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia found Feres’s second rationale of “federal 
relationship” lacking as well.  Feres originally concluded that Congress did 
not intend for state tort law to govern a “‘distinctively federal’ relationship” 
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between a service member and the government.249  If Congress had not 
intended for state tort law to govern recovery under the FTCA due to the 
unfairness of applying a law to a service member who does not have a choice 
in his geographic location, this reasoning was defeated when the Court 
allowed federal prisoners, who are under similar geographic circumstances, 
to recover damages against prison authorities under the FTCA.250  In other 
words, if unfairness is the key underlying factor, then it is more unfair to 
disallow claims due to “nonuniform recovery” than to allow “uniform 
nonrecovery.”251 
Further, the Feres Court reasoned that the military requires uniform 
recovery.252  However, this rationale also falls short.  On the one hand, the 
Court has allowed service members to recover for injuries not incident to 
their service and, on the other hand, has allowed civilians to recover for 
negligence by service members.  In other words, the Court’s own holdings 
have effectively rendered the uniformity reasoning defunct.253 
Lastly, the Feres Court reasoned that Congress had not intended for 
service members to receive double recovery under both the FTCA and 
Veteran Benefits Act for injuries or death incident to service.254  However, 
in Brooks and United States v. Brown255—both cases which have not been 
overruled by the Supreme Court—the Court found that the VBA was not an 
“exclusive” remedy.256  Furthermore, Justice Scalia found that recovery 
under the FTCA is actually not comparable to the VBA.  Although the Feres 
Court found that the VBA was comparable to state workers compensation 
statutes, Justice Scalia noted it was easier to recover and terminate recovery 
under the VBA than state workers compensation schemes and the VBA did 
not exclude injuries “incident to service,” unlike the FTCA.257 
However, since the Supreme Court later held that the rationales 
contemplated in Feres and discussed above were “no longer controlling,”258 
the most pertinent rationale was the judiciary’s interference in military good 
order and discipline and decision-making.  In response to this rationale, 
Justice Scalia commented that it was “outlandish to consider that result 
‘outlandish,’ since in fact it occurs frequently, even under the Feres 
dispensation.”259  According to Justice Scalia, service members who 
sustained an injury from another service member’s negligence compared to 
civilians who sustained the same injury at the hand of the same service 
member, under the same set of circumstances, require the same type of 
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inquiries and interference with military decision-making.260  However, in this 
particular circumstance, only the service member’s recovery would be barred 
under the Feres doctrine while the courts will still “interfere” in military 
policies and decision-making for the civilian’s FTCA claim.  Thus, the most 
critical rationale, interference in military decision-making, does not actually 
carry out its purpose, and, as Justice Scalia plainly stated, “neither the three 
original Feres reasons nor the post hoc rationalization of ‘military discipline’ 
justifies [the Court’s] failure to apply the FTCA as written.”261  Accordingly, 
Justice Scalia’s analysis highlights the logical inconsistencies of the Feres 
doctrine and suggests that the judicially created Feres doctrine at least 
requires thorough reconsideration. 
B.  Policy Arguments Against the Feres Doctrine 
Several policy considerations also call for caution in expanding the Feres 
doctrine to apply to MSAs, specifically in cases brought by cadets and 
midshipmen for administrative mismanagement of sexual assault. 
One of the primary stated goals of MSAs is to produce outstanding and 
capable future leaders of the military.262  In addition to producing leaders, 
the MSAs are top-ranking educational institutions263 that attract many young 
men and women who aspire not only to serve their country, but also to pursue 
a high-quality education.  Yet, the real-life negative consequences of the 
Feres doctrine diminish the effectiveness of MSAs in producing capable 
future leaders of the military and in recruiting the very best applicants who 
might be considering other elite civilian colleges.  This Part addresses the 
issues surrounding how MSAs currently address sexual assault and how the 
Feres doctrine exacerbates the mismanagement that occurs when MSAs 
handle sexual assaults under current doctrine. 
1.  Retaliation and Military-Service Academies 
According to the Department of Defense’s annual report on MSAs, around 
50 percent of female cadets and midshipmen who filed sexual assault reports 
described experiencing retaliation in the form of ostracism and 
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maltreatment.264  Moreover, around 13 percent of these women reported 
experiencing some form of professional reprisal.265  Interestingly, much of 
the retaliation these cadets and midshipmen experienced is not considered 
retaliation under military policy and military law.266  Even though MSAs 
have been implementing policies to prohibit retaliation against victims who 
report their assaults, each school, astonishingly, only received one retaliation 
allegation from 2015 through 2016.267 
The statistics provided by this annual report paint a general picture of the 
hostile climate the cadets and midshipmen potentially face for reporting their 
sexual assaults.  However, the annual report falls short in portraying the 
jarring experiences of retaliation that many victims have faced and have 
recently come forward with in the media.  On December 11, 2017, CBS This 
Morning released its findings of a six-month investigation into sexual assault 
at the Air Force Academy.268  Two former cadets disclosed their experiences 
of retaliation and maltreatment after reporting their sexual assaults.  CBS This 
Morning also interviewed with two current cadets who spoke under 
anonymity due to the retaliation they had already faced and in fear of future 
retaliation on their military careers.269 
One former cadet, Melissa Hildremyr, was mistreated by the Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations, which blamed Hildremyr for her own sexual 
assault and questioned the veracity of her statement.270  At the end of the 
harrowing process with the USAFA, Hildremyr ultimately left the Air Force 
Academy, while her rapist graduated.271  Similarly, Annie Kendzior, a 
former midshipman of the USNA, testified in front of the House 
Subcommittee on Military Personnel about her distressing experiences with 
the administration after being sexually assaulted.272  In her testimony, 
Kendzior commented on the biased procedure of the Academic Review 
Board and how she was “repeatedly encouraged to resign by USNA 
officials.”273  Similar to Hildremyr, Kendzior left the Naval Academy, 
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largely because of her stressful experience with Naval Academy officials, 
while both of her rapists graduated.274 
It is clear that reporting sexual assault comes at a great cost to a cadet or 
midshipman’s future academic career and his or her career in the military.  
Moreover, once the cadet or midshipman reports their sexual assault, they 
also risk MSAs mismanaging their cases.  In a system where superior officers 
handle a cadet’s or midshipman’s sexual assault case in a biased manner, 
what remedies are available to hold MSA administrators accountable?  The 
only remedy may be to seek recourse in civilian courts.  However, the Feres 
doctrine has foreclosed this option for the cadets and midshipmen who wish 
to bring a tort or constitutional claim against the MSAs for such 
mismanagement.  As a result, they are left bereft of any judicial remedy at 
all.275 
2.  Consequences of Mismanagement of Sexual Assault Cases 
in Military-Service Academies 
Throughout the various statements of cadets and midshipmen who 
experienced sexual assault at MSAs, there exists an underlying connection:  
all of those cadets and midshipmen were enthusiastic to attend MSAs and 
serve their country in the U.S. Armed Forces.  However, many left MSAs 
due to the treatment they received after their sexual assault.276  There are dire 
consequences for allowing mismanagement of sexual assault cases to 
continue not only in MSAs, but in the military as a whole.  In particular, the 
loss of qualified candidates can negatively affect the diversity of military 
leadership. 
Diversity is essential in the military.  In Grutter v. Bollinger,277 high-
ranking military officers submitted an amicus brief asserting that racially 
diverse officers were essential to national security.278  Officers of the military 
also submitted an amicus brief in United States v. Virginia279 to argue that 
women were crucial to military success by recounting important 
contributions of women in service.280  In that case, Justice Ginsburg cited an 
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amicus brief submitted by active and retired female service members281 
which noted the successes of women at MSAs and the “vital contributions 
and courageous performance of women in the military”282 to support the 
Court’s holding that the Virginia Military Institute cannot prohibit women 
from attending the institution because of fears that women are not capable of 
becoming “citizen-soldiers.”283  Both cases presented the MSAs as 
universities that train future leaders of the military.  In Grutter especially, the 
amicus brief was influential in establishing that civilian universities that also 
directly shape the leaders of tomorrow need diversity just like the military.284 
More importantly, the military has made its stance clear.285  Diversity is 
necessary to the military, and the benefits of diversity, whether from racial 
or gender diversity, have advanced the military establishment as a whole.286  
Nonetheless, the MSA administrations’ reaction to sexual assault paints a 
different picture.  Allowing biased treatment of sexual assault victims, 
largely female cadets and midshipmen, has already caused many qualified 
future leaders of the military to drop out of school.  Moreover, MSAs, who 
compete with other top-ranked universities for blue-chip applicants, stand to 
lose capable future leaders of the military if such practices persist. 
3.  Direct Impact of Sexual Assault on Leadership in the Military 
Compared to civilian universities whose graduates pursue an occupation 
of their choice, graduates of MSAs are required by law to become officers of 
the military.287  Professor Thomas H. Lee commented on the unique nature 
of MSAs: 
Nor, for that matter, can civilian undergraduate colleges, or indeed, any 
civilian institution of higher learning, assert the sort of robust causal claim 
that the military academies can . . . .  The military service academies and 
officer training programs are unique gate-keeping institutions insofar as 
they are a sufficient condition for direct entry into leadership of an 
important public institution—the officer corps of the nation’s armed 
forces.288 
Due to MSA graduates’ direct induction into military leadership, cadets 
and midshipmen play an important role in shaping how the military operates 
and potentially have a significant impact on how their subordinates behave 
within the military system as well. 
The direct impact officers have in preventing sexual assault within their 
ranks has been corroborated by research.  One study conducted on 506 female 
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veterans who served in all branches of the military from 1961 through 1997 
found that 79 percent of the participants had experienced sexual harassment 
during their service and around one-third of the participants had been 
raped.289  Not surprisingly, the majority of the women who had been raped 
had also experienced sexual harassment as well.290 
More importantly, the results of this particular study showed that an officer 
permitting or engaging in sexual harassment and other types of similar 
behavior was “associated with a three to four-fold increase in odds of 
rape.”291  The study also showed that even subtle forms of sexual harassment 
could significantly increase the risk of sexual assault.292  In sum, behavior 
exhibited by the leadership plays a critical factor in the likelihood of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault occurring within military ranks.293  However, 
as seen with Hildremyr’s and Kendzior’s experiences, many of the 
perpetrators graduate and are placed in leadership positions, thereby 
increasing the risk of continuing a destructive cycle of sexual assault within 
the military. 
It is therefore crucial that MSAs not only provide an environment in which 
cadets and midshipmen are not afraid to speak out, but also ensure that 
perpetrators within the MSAs do not enter the military.  Considering the risk 
of sexual assault at MSAs, the mismanagement of sexual assault by school 
administration, and the lack of legal recourse against the MSAs for this 
mismanagement, the MSAs stand to lose many qualified, usually female, 
candidates who desire to serve in the military. 
V.  PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE:  ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION FOR MSAS 
If the Feres doctrine is not legally sound and has dire policy consequences, 
then what is a possible remedy to legal precedent that has been cemented in 
the American legal system for the past sixty-seven years?  The only plausible 
solution lies within Congress’s powers to legislate an additional exception to 
the FTCA. 
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for thirteen exceptions setting forth 
non-eligible claims.  Within these exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) is the only 
one that specifically addresses military service members.  The statute states:  
“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b)294 of this title shall not 
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apply to . . . (j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the 
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war . . . .”295 
According to the text of this exception, it is clear that Congress intended 
some FTCA claims to be unavailable to service members.  For example, 
under this exception, a service member would not be able to bring an FTCA 
claim against the United States for sending that service member into a war 
zone where she was injured.  This example clearly is in line with what the 
Feres doctrine has considered an injury “incident to service,” and it is 
obvious why such decisions may interfere with military good order and 
discipline.296  However, for other cases that are not related to combat, the 
decision of where to draw the line for an injury “incident to service” is 
unclear.297  What is clear is that such inconsistencies have resulted in the 
Feres doctrine expanding beyond what may have been originally intended by 
Congress and what the Feres Court first articulated.298 
With no indication that the current Supreme Court intends to overrule 
Feres, it cannot be dismantled by judges alone.  Nor does this Note urge that 
it be wholly abandoned or abandoned anywhere other than the specific 
context of sexual assault and discrimination at the MSAs.  Therefore, the only 
possible avenue to specifically and cohesively address the rights of cadets 
and midshipmen under the FTCA and Feres doctrine is through legislation.  
Feres, after all, is a judicially made doctrine that is not required by the 
Constitution.  The legislative enactment of another exception would balance 
not only the main concern of the Feres doctrine—the judicial interference 
with military decision-making—but also the need for legal recourse for 
cadets who have been sexually assaulted within the MSAs. 
A potential model statute for this exception is provided here: 
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not 
apply to . . . 
(o) Any claim arising out of the United States federal service academies in 
relation to military activities, discipline, and decision-making.  Provided, 
that, with regard to administrative acts or omissions, in relation to operation 
of the United States federal service academies as educational institutions, 
the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to 
any claims, brought by cadets or midshipmen, arising out of gross 
negligence of faculty and administrators of the United States federal service 
academies, including any civilians or officers employed by the United 
States federal service academies.  For the purposes of this subsection, 
“cadets or midshipmen” means any student currently attending, or who had 
attended at the time when the events of the claims arose, any of the United 
States federal service academies. 
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This model statute is based upon another FTCA exception, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(h), which disallows claims such as battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment against federal employees, except against law enforcement 
officers of the federal government.  If Congress can craft such an exception 
to an exception, it is also capable of contemplating one for MSA cadets and 
midshipmen as well.  The model statute refers only to cadets and midshipmen 
because they occupy a gray area between full active-duty service members 
and students of higher-education institutions.299  Interference with military 
good order and discipline is implicated at a higher degree for claims brought 
by active-duty military personnel, as they are first and foremost employees 
of the government.  On the other hand, cadets and midshipmen are first and 
foremost students pursuing a college education who will eventually acquire 
an active-duty obligation upon graduation.300  Further, they are primarily 
interacting with MSA administrations not as service members, but as 
students of an academic institution.301  Therefore, Congress should enact the 
statute provided or one of a similar nature.  The model statute offers Congress 
the ability to address the persistent sexual assault issues within MSAs 
without overturning the Feres doctrine for the rest of active-duty military 
personnel. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the nearly seventy years of its existence, the Feres doctrine has 
foreclosed many options for service members seeking damages for injuries 
sustained while in service of the U.S. Armed Forces.  Although the Feres 
doctrine has its merits, the injustices resulting from its unforgiving 
application has left cadets and midshipmen of military-service academies 
without legal recourse for claims regarding the school’s mismanagement of 
their sexual assault cases.  With harsh repercussions, such as social and 
professional retaliation for reporting sexual assault, the Feres doctrine also 
places undue burden upon cadets and midshipmen who wish to hold military-
service academies’ administrations accountable for the dire mismanagement 
of sexual harassment and assault that occurred on MSA grounds.  The current 
social and political climate also calls for reconsideration of the Feres doctrine 
for cadets and midshipmen of military-service academies.  With social 
movements such as #MeToo302 and proliferation of news coverage of 
rampant sexual assault in a wide variety of industries,303 victims of sexual 
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assault are calling for more accountability and action.  In this new era of 
awareness, Congress can no longer sit idly by as the conspicuous issue of 
sexual assault continues unabated.  The lack of remedies for sexual assault 
victims in military-service academies must be addressed, and Congress must 
be the one to do it. 
